Definition

Let Γ=(N,(Ti)i∈N,p,S,(st)t∈T)\Gamma = (N, (T_i)_{i \in N}, p, S, (s_t)_{t \in T}) be a game with incomplete information. The agent-form game Γˆ\hat{\Gamma} corresponding to Γ\Gamma is the following game in strategic-form:

  • set of players ∪i∈NTi\cup_{i \in N} T_i: every type of each player in Γ\Gamma is a player in Γ\Gamma
  • set of pure strategies of player tit_i in Γˆ\hat{\Gamma} is Ai(ti)A_i(t_i), set of available actions of that type in the game Γˆ\hat{\Gamma}.
  • payoff function uˆti\hat{u}_{t_i} of player tit_i in Γˆ\hat{\Gamma} is given byuˆti(a):=∑t−i∈T−ip(t−i|ti)ui(ti,t−i;(aj(tj))j∈N)\hat{u}_{t_i}(a) := \sum_{t_{-i} \in T_{-i}} p(t_{-i} \vert t_i) u_i(t_i, t_{-i}; (a_j(t_j))_{j \in N}) where a=(aj(tj))j∈N,tj∈Tja = (a_j(t_j))_{j \in N, t_j \in T_j} denotes vector of actions of all players in Γˆ\hat{\Gamma}.

See also


References

  1. M. Maschler, E. Solan, and Shmuel Zamir, Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 354.